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Abstract: The dynamic and multi-objective programming is used here to establish a risk 
measurement model. We develop an iterative algorithm and the convergence conditions 
for the model solution. The results obtained from the model developed here show that the 
sum of the interactive utility value (IUV) could determine whether or not the interactive 
relationship is characterized by independence among negotiators. In addition, the 
numerical example shows that this risk measurement model of the negotiation group can 
reflect risk assessment by the negotiation group for certain events and can analyze 
interaction characteristics among negotiators. We show the    feasibility and applicability 
of the model and the exact solution algorithm, and their policy relevance for analyzing 
BOT projects.     
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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a risk measurement model that can be 
applied to analyze large scale infrastructure projects, among others. BOT (Build, Operate 
and Transfer)
1 is a  process where the private sector is granted a concession to plan, 
design, construct, operate and maintain a project. This technique is useful because, 
generally speaking, there are high financial risks for major infrastructure projects (Tiong, 
1995). Thus, private sector enterprises are invited by the government to participate in a 
BOT project in order to share the potential risks that occur in the project development 
                                                 
1 Usually BOT is described as a kind of privatization process; but theoretically the ownership pattern is less 
important for efficiency analysis than the engineering and economic aspects. However, if the characteristics 
of the owners to whom the transfer part of BOT applies vary systematically depending on whether they are 
private or public entities, then the negotiation process will clearly be affected in systematic ways. In this 
paper, we focus on transfer to private ownership. 
  1process. 
In the BOT concept proposed by Walker and Smith (1996), after completion of the 
tendering stage for the major infrastructure of a BOT project, the enterprise which 
receives first priority for contract negotiation will form a BOT Concession Company, 
which is a team enterprise. The Concession Company will then go through concession 
contract negotiation with the government in order to discuss the risk factors, their explicit 
description and possible ways of sharing them. The results are then put into relevant 
documents and the contract. Therefore, the purpose of risk sharing is achieved through 
contract negotiation between the government and Concession Company. The concession 
contract negotiation is accomplished through BOT negotiation team and the government 
negotiation team, whereas the BOT concession contract negotiation process includes 
public and private participation and repeated discussion (Tiong, 1997). 
Before negotiation, the negotiation groups from both the Concession Company and the 
government department conduct risk measurement internally regarding those uncertain 
factors existing in the contract. Such internal risk measurements naturally reflect, among 
other things, their experience and the information collected( the information set, to use the 
terminology of Game Theory). This is done in order to better account for  the different 
types of risks and determine which are primary and which are secondary risks. Generally 
speaking, after risks have been evaluated by the decision-makers, the negotiation group 
will discuss internally to determine the risk events. Such "discussion" within the 
negotiation group can be formalized via the idea of a utility interaction among negotiators.  
 Since the initial and by now,  classical, proposal from Bernoulli, the utility function 
has been utilized widely in decision-maker’s risk analysis. Among recent contributions, 
Bell (1995), shows that the maximum value of expected utility function can reveal the 
characteristics of high return and high risk. The Multi-attribute Utility (MAU) proposed 
by Keeney and Raiffa (1993) has been adopted for the study of decision-making behavior 
(Bose, et al., 1997), and for risk analysis of engineering projects (William and Crandall, 
1982). Although the MAU model has additive utility and multiplicative utility, it assumes 
that the decision-maker’s  preference map
2 is independent and cannot be used to explain 
interactive behavior during the negotiation process. Feng and Kang (1999, 2000), Feng, 
Kang, and Tzeng (2000) adopted the MAU theory to study risk measurement for BOT 
                                                 
2 For a theorem giving the exact conditions under which the preference map can be represented by a 
real-valued utility function, see Debreu(1959). 
  2concession contracts.
3 Those studies include risk preferences of the negotiators and 
determine the primary and secondary risks associated with a BOT project. However, those 
studies do not investigate risk measurement for utility interaction between negotiators. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate utility interaction among the negotiators, and to 
develop a utility dependence model that can be applied for risk measurement.  
In the past, studies regarding utility interaction have included analysis of utility 
dependence (i.e, the Monte Carlo method), Team Theory ( Marschak and Radner, 1972; 
McGuire and Radner 1986;Kim and Roush, 1987) and mathematical programming 
(Haimes, 1998; Orlovski, 1990). As to the simulation approach used in applied  utility 
analysis, Carbone (1997) adopted the Monte Carlo method to develop rank-dependent 
expected utility theory, and to distinguish the decision-making behavior for various 
models, such as pair-wise choice utility, expected utility theory, prospective reference 
theory and weight utility theory. One difficulty here is that  when utility is simulated by 
the Monte Carlo method, all the utility values, simulated parameters and probabilities 
have to be pre-set. However, when utility values of any one of the decision-makers 
interact with those of other decision-makers, it is not easy to determine a priori which 
values of parameter and probability distribution should be pre-set. 
In the mathematical analysis of utility dependence, the question of whether or not the 
utility of event is related to probability requires further investigation (Belichrosdt and 
Quiggin, 1997; Daniels and Keller, 1990). The rank-dependent utility theory proposed by 
Belichrosdt and Quiggin (1997) assumes that probability is one of the endogenous 
variables of utility function, and investigates the relationships between utility and joint or 
marginal probability. If the probability of utility function is a joint one, then the event 
utility will not be obtained from the expected utility value. In addition, Quiggin (1991) 
relaxes the condition of independence for unrelated outcomes because he believes that a 
specific utility may have certain relationships with those outcomes that are not completely 
independent from one another. Thus the concept of probability weight and an associated 
linear transformation can be adopted. Applying a scale constant between 0~1, we can 
combine various utility outcomes and compute expected values to obtain the total utility 
and rank preferences. This is the basic idea behind a rank-dependent expected utility 
theory (RDEU). 
                                                 
3 In a different context, Gang and Khan(1989, 1990,1991,1993,1999), Khan and Hoshino(1992) and 
Khan(1994,1995a,b, 1996-97,1997, forthcoming a, b) use loss minimization for decisionmakers with 
bounded rationality. 
  3The team theory proposed by Kim and Roush (1987)
4 adopted the concept of 
coordination to investigate the interaction issues between decision-maker and 
environmental factors. This was done by integrating the parallel team, chain team, 
coordination team, and search team to analyze the interactive behavior between the 
decision-maker and the factors of environment. Kim and Roush (1987) focus their studies 
on the impacts of environmental factors associated with the team utility, and they did not 
discuss the issue of interaction issue among decision-makers. 
Recently in the area of  risk measurement  via mathematical programming, Haimes 
(1998) has proposed the risk measurement concept of multi-objective programming and a 
dynamic programming approach. On the other hand, Orlovski (1990) proposed the 
concept of fuzzy bi-level programming approach to analyze the two-person game problem. 
Reviewing these studies, we can see that mathematical programming is another approach 
for risk measurement that can also be applied in two-person game problems or 
coordination problems.  
In this paper, we first discuss the background of our research in Section 2. Section 3 
presents the assumptions for developing a dependent-utility model for individual 
negotiators and negotiation groups. In this section, we also develop dependent-utility 
models for individual negotiators and negotiation groups. This is followed by Section 4, 
where we develop the iterative algorithm and converging factors for the dependent utility 
negotiation group. In Section 5, we proposed a numerical example to examine the risk 
measurement for a BOT project. Finally, we draw some conclusions and present some 
thoughts  for future research. 
                                                 
4 As noted earlier mathematical economists Marschak and Radner (1972)are the original contributors here. 
But we follow the more recent exposition. 
  42. Background: Negotiations and Utility 
In this section, for concreteness, we assume that a transportation infrastructure project will 
be implemented using BOT, and that the Concession Company and government each will 
carry out the contract negotiation process. Usually and without loss of generality, we can 
assume that the government negotiation team includes the members representing 
transportation, environmental agencies, and local officials. Meanwhile, the Concession 
Company negotiation team includes lawyers, financial consultants, the initiator, and the 
engineering experts. The principal negotiator from each team is in charge of the 
negotiation process. Naturally, if the negotiation fails, the concession contract will not be 
valid. The negotiation process aims to discuss possible uncertainties in the contract, define 
the individual rights and obligations of each party and, finally, write all agreements in a 
concessional format. Figure 1 presents a conceptual diagram of this process. 
Before signing the concession contract, the government and BOT Concession 
Company  undergo the so-called risk-sharing negotiation steps to determine which risk 
events will be included in the contract. In this negotiation process, if both parties cannot 
accept a specific risk event, then it will result in the topic of negotiation in the next 
meeting; and the negotiation group will conduct internal discussion regarding the subject 
risk items and re-assess the risk items. In addition, if a negotiator completes preliminary 
risk measurement for a specific event, the negotiation group should continue future 
discussion regarding the risk level of the risk events.  
individual negotiator
BOT Private Group Government Group
if both parties can not accept a specific risk event, the
negotiation group will conduct internal discussion regarding the
specific risk event and re-assess the risk of the specific event.
 
Figure 1: the conceptual map of interactive utility among negotiators 
 
It should be emphasized that there is discussion within the negotiation groups. This 
implies that other participants’ decision variables may affect the utility results of a specific 
negotiator. In addition, it also implies that the utility of the subject negotiator may affect 
  5the utility results of other participants. Thus, we face almost a classic type of externality 
problem. The factors that involve human interaction can be modeled by certain types of 
(non-)cooperative game theory. There are two different types of interaction that occur 
during decision-making: one is the mutually independent variety  (concept of Fig.1); the 
other is characterized by a process of negotiation existing during the decision-making 
process (concept of Fig.2). The second type is clearly amenable to modeling according to  
cooperative game theory, and is the topic that is studied in this paper. We offer a rather 
strikingly simple way to model a complex process in what follows. 
Generally speaking, whenever there is  discussion among the negotiators, an utility 
interaction can be said to exist. The status of utility interaction may  become stable after 
several rounds of discussion, and a domestic "consensus" of the negotiation group for a 
specific event can thus be obtained. The characteristics of the utility interaction among the 
negotiators include rules of binary interactive, feedback and expansion. If there is no 
utility interaction among the negotiators, then the utility is independent; otherwise the 
utility is dependent. The conceptual model for internal discussion within a negotiation 








Figure 2 Conceptual map of risk measurement through internal discussion among 
negotiators 
 
3.  A Model  
In this section we describe the assumptions  and  develop a dependent utility model in a 
setting for both individual negotiators and negotiation groups. 
3.1 The assumptions  
    The assumptions for our model are as follows: 
(1) Agency relationships exist between negotiators and the parties they represent. 
  6However, we assume for simplicity that the agent's costs are independent of    the 
negotiators’ utility.   
(2) The utility function of the negotiator is a continuous real valued function.     
(3) The negotiator makes decisions rationally, i.e. s/he optimizes in a risky environment. 
(4) The probability distribution of attribute-outcome occurrence is a Bernoulli experiment. 
Where the probability of occurrence is regarded as the probability of success. 
  Assumption (1) indicates that the negotiator is authorized by a specific organization. 
However, if the agency cost is not equal to zero, adverse-selection behavior might occur.   
Assumption (2) implies that the utility function satisfies the N-M (Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern) axioms. Assumption (3) satisfies the principle of maximizing 
utility while minimizing risk. Finally, Assumption (4) ensures that the negotiator assesses 
the attribute outcome, state and probability of the event based on previous experience or 
factual information in a    consistent way according to the statistical decision theory.   
3.2 Definition of risk-state  
   We assume that there are  uncertain states for a specific event, say   
. Let   indicate  the  th state, where 
n
j
, , 2 1 , Λ s s
n s j s n j ,..., 2 , 1 = ; and let   indicate  the 
occurrence probability of the state . Every state  corresponds to an outcome of 
attribute ; and every outcome of attribute    corresponds to a utility value  . In 
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) ( j j x j u ×
) x ( u  is the average utility value for all of the states. 
Based on the risk defined by Buhlmann (1996) and the risk preference concept 
defined by Keeney and Raiffa (1993), we define the risk-state as  following: a risk state 
exists when for the decision-maker, the actual utility of a specific event under a certain 
state is less than the average utility of all the states, as shown in Eq. (1). 
) ( ) ( x u x u R j j j < ≡ ,∀                                            (1)  j
Where the direction of the inequality indicates that state   is a risk state;   is the 
utility value of the negotiator regarding state   for a specific event; and 0 ; 
. 
j ) ( j j x u
( ≤ j x u j 1 ) ≤ j
1 0 ≤ ≤ j p
 It is worth reemphasizing that eq. (1) tells us that, for a specific negotiator,and a 
certain event, if the utility value of the outcome of attribute   is less than the average 
utility value of all the outcomes of attribute, then the subject event is a risk event under 
state  . The relationships among state, attribute and probability of an event are shown in 
Table 1.  
j x
j s
     Table 1 Representation among event state, attribute outcome, and utility 
 
  7  State (S ) 
  n j s s s s ,..., ,..., , 2 1  
Outcome of attribute  x  n j x x x x ,..., ,..., , 2 1  
Probability            p n j p p p p ,..., ,..., , 2 1  
Utility             u  n j u u u u ,..., ,..., , 2 1  
 
  According to eq. (1), although  ,  , because the difference of 
measured utility value can be great, therefore the averaged utility value may be greater 
than 1. In this case it can not meet the requirement that the averaged utility value should 
be in the range of [ 0,1]. For simplified comparison, we utilize the transformation of 
utility proposed by Keeney and Raiffa, and normalize eq. (1). As shown below ,  
1 ) ( 0 ≤ ≤ j j x u 1 0 ≤ ≤ j p
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x u p x u p
x u p x u p
x u j j j j j j
j j j j j j
j j j j j
j j ∀ × ≠ ×
× − ×
× − ×
= )}, ( { min )} ( { max ,
)} ( { min )} ( { max
)} ( { min ) (
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*  (2) 
where   is the normalized utility value.  ) ( *
j j x u
Since   and  , the normalized utility value meets the constraint 
of lying between 0 and 1. When 
j j
1 ) ( 0 ≤ ≤ j j x u 1 0 ≤ ≤ j p
{ max )} ( { min )} ( j j j j x u p x u p × = × , then  .  <  0 ) ( * = j j x u ) ( *
j j x u
) (
* x u  means that the negotiator believes there is risk for a specific event under state   
and outcome of attribute  . In other words, the outcome of attribute   for the specific 
event under state   belongs to a risk state. Notice the strict inequality characterizing the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the risk event. 
j s
j x j x
j s
3.3 Dependent utility model for negotiation group   
   In this section, we present the conception of utility linear transformation, and construct 
a dependent utility model for both an individual negotiator and a group negotiator.  
3.3.1. Concept of utility linear transformation 
Assume there are three negotiators in the negotiation group, and define   as 
the interactive utility value (IUV), where   means that during discussion #
) , ( 1 , 2 t x j α
) , ( 1 , 2 t x j α t  for 
the outcome of attribute   of event  , the utility value of negotiator #2 affects the 
utility of negotiator #1. In addition,   is defined as an event or decision-making policy of 
the BOT private group. Similarly the others  ,  ,  ,  , 
,  ,  ,  ,  , and   are constants on 
the closed interval  [0,1].  
j x




( 2 , 1
) ,t
) ,t
( 3 , 1 x j α
) t ( 3 , 2 x j α
) , ( 1 , 3 t x j α
( 2 , 3 α
) , ( 2 , 3 x j α , ( 3 , 2 t x j α
) ,t x j
) t
) , ( 3 , 1 t x j α ) , ( 1 , 3 t x j α ) , , 2 t α α
   Assume that the utility function satisfies the N-M axiom. Based on the utility linear 
transformation concept of Fishburn (1990), we can state the following: 
 if the utility function satisfies the continuity, transitivity and weak independent axioms, 
  8then the utility function can be a linear transformation, i.e.  α ∃   ] 1 , 0 [ , ∈ α , and 
, such that U , the U  still satisfies " f f f U t u t u ∈ ) ( ), ( 2 1 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 t u t u t f f f α α − + = ) (t f φ " 
(binary preference relation). 
It is now necessary to combine  the concepts of utility linear transformation and 
utility normalization. We can thus carry on the utility linear transformation for the utility 
value of those three negotiators in our example. We have according to the notation 
introduced earlier, 
  ,  ,  ,  ,  , and  .  ) , ( 2 , 1 t x j α ) , ( 1 , 2 t x j α ) , ( 3 , 2 t x j α ) , ( 2 , 3 t x j α ) , ( 3 , 1 t x j α ) , ( 1 , 3 t x j α
 The transformed utility model is shown in eqs. (3) to (5).  
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f α α α α + + − − = +      (5) 
where   is the utility value of negotiator #1 for attribute-outcome   of event  
at discussion #
) , ( 1 t x u j
f
j x f
t ;  is the utility value of negotiator #2 for attribute-outcome   of 
event   at discussion #
) , ( 2 t x u j
f
j x
f t ;    is the utility value of negotiator #3 for 
attribute-outcome   of event  at discussion #
) , ( 3 t x u j
f
j x f t ; and 
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where  t  is discussion number,  T t , , 2 , 1 , 0 Λ = . 
As shown in eqs. (3) to (5), previous discussion of a specific negotiator may affect 
the utility of other negotiators through IUV. This is analogous to working with a 
time-series with memory. But the additional complication arises from intertemporal 
externalities. As for the other negotiators, they will affect that specific negotiator during 
current discussion through IUV so that there is indeed an interactive game with feedback 
features.  
3.3.2. A Dependent utility model  
Assume there are   negotiators in the negotiation group,  q Q q , , 2 , 1 Λ = . The negotiator 
 has the utility of outcome of attribute   for event   during discussion # q j x f t  and # 1 + t . 
 and  , where   and  . After linear 
transformation of utility functions of negotiator #1 and other negotiators, the resulting 
utility function  is shown in eq. (6). The conceptual diagram for dependent utility among 
 negotiators negotiation group is shown in Figure 3. 
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where   is the interactive utility value for the outcome of attribute   toward 
event , and the utility value of negotiator #  affects the utility of negotiator #1 at 
discussion #
) , ( 1 , t x j q α j x
f q
t ; 
) , ( , 1 t x j q α  is the interactive utility value for outcome of attribute   toward event , and 
the utility value of negotiator #1 affects the utility of negotiator #  at discussion #
j x f
q t ; 
 is the utility value of negotiator #  for outcome of attribute   toward event  
at discussion #
) , ( t x u j
f
q q j x f
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Figure 3. Diagram of the interactive utility among   negotiators  q
    Similarly, the utility functions of negotiators #2, # , and #  can undergo linear 
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For eq. (6), u  will change as both  ,   and   
change. As a result, other negotiators and interactive utility values (IUV) among the 
negotiators will also affect the utility of negotiator #1 at discussion #
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q
  10therefore,    will fall in the closed interval [0,1] and  the inequalities 
 will also hold. Let  , then  . This means 
that the utility assessed by negotiator #1 is unchanged for attribute   of event   at 
discussion #  and #
) 1 , ( 1 + t x u j
f
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t . It also indicates that negotiator #1 is unaffected by other 
negotiators, i.e., he/she is utility-independent. However, when  , it means that 
other negotiators are related to negotiator #1 via interdependent utilities. When 
, it means that negotiator #1 was affected completely by other negotiators, 
and gave up his/her original measured value. When 0 , then eq. (6) is the 
dependent utility model for negotiator #1 and other negotiators. When  , the 
degree of utility-dependence is higher; contrarily, when  , the degree of 
utility-dependence is lower. For eqs. (7) to (9), whether or not the negotiators are 
dependent will depend on whether or not variables  ￿ ￿ , 
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    In eqs. (6) to (9), there is linear relationship between utility of negotiator   at 
discussion #  and utility of other negotiator at discussion #t. And since   negotiator 
affect others utility each other through IUV, so IUV is the endogenous variable of the 
utility function of the individual negotiator and also the negotiation group. Which is 
), (x ( , 2 ∑ u q
f α ,k q α . Since after 
linear transformation, u  and   satisfy the N-M Axiom, GU  still 
satisfies the binary  preference relation (Fishburn, 1990). Therefore the utility of the 
negotiation group can be represented by expected utility value, and the expected utility 
value can be obtained by the concept of the preference decomposition theory (Bleichorodt 
and Quiggin, 1997). Therefore,  summing up the utility function of individual negotiator, 
and obtaining the negotiation group’s utility value we getGU , as shown in eq. 
(10). 
) ,t x j
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However, there is an iterative and recursive relation between  , 
 and u . So it can be handled by either forward 
or backward dynamic programming. The backward procedure of dynamic programming is 
applied in this paper to handle the iteration and recursion relation as follows. Substitute 
eqs. (6) to (9) into Eq. (10) to obtain Eq. (11). 
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f
) , , 1 , , 1 , , ( T n t t t x u j
f
k Λ Λ− + + ) , , 1 , , 1 , , ( T n t t t xj
f
q Λ Λ− + +
     (11) 
; , , , , , 2 , 1 ; , , , , 2 , 1
)] 1 , ( )) , ( ( )) 1 , ( )) , ( ( ) ) , ( 1 ((
)) 1 , ( )) , ( ( ) ) , ( 1 (( )) 1 , ( )) , ( 1 (( ) , (
)) 1 , ( ) , ( ) ) , ( 1 (( )) 1 , ( ) , ( ) ) , ( 1 ((





































q k Q q Q k
x u t x x u t x t x
x u t x t x x u t x t x
x u t x t x x u t x t x












































































j k q j
f
≠ = = ∀
+ − +
− + − +
− + − +
− + − = +
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑


















Λ λ Λ Λ λ Λ
α α α
α α α α
α α α α
α α α
Eq. (11) is the utility value of the negotiation group when attribute-outcome   of event 
 at discussion #
j x
f 1 + t
2 , j x
is realized. This value can be obtained through weighting of utility of 
the individual negotiator at discussion #1. If it converges after first discussion among 
negotiators, that indicates that there is no dispersion or iteration during the discussion 
process. We can substitute   into the first and second items of the right side of eq. (11) 
and obtain GU . When 
1 = t
( ( f
k u ) ( f



















( ,k q α 0 = , 
Eq. (11) becomes  , and the utility value of the negotiation group is the 
sum of individual negotiators’ utility. In other words, when a negotiator is 
utility-independent, the utility value of the negotiation group can be obtained through 
addition of the original utility of the individual negotiator. This result turns out to be the 








q j x u x ) 1 , ( 2 , ( f GU
  12independent-utility of Luce and Fishburn (1995)
5. 
When   and , eq. (11) becomes GU , 
which shows that the utility value of the negotiation group from a realization of the 
outcome of attribute   of event   is the sum of the IUV values multiplied by the utility 
of the individual negotiator. This shows that although there is no independence 
phenomenon among the negotiators, but if the negotiators reach consensus during first 
discussion, there is no iteration relation among the negotiators. At this point GU  
reverts back to the weight of individual’s utility and the IUV value. When  , then 
, which means when discussion among the negotiators is completed three 
times, the utility value of the negotiation group toward the outcome of attribute   of 
event   will be affected and changed by the utility of the individual negotiator, the IUV 
values, and variable  . Since 0 ,   and 0 , then the 
utility of negotiation group will decrease with increasing numbers of discussion and the 
IUV values will become stable. This completes our demonstration. We now turn to some 
technical issues in the context of the multi-objective programming paradigm.
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4.  Some considerations within the framework of a multi-objective programming 
model 
Event   with  states has to be integrated into one utility value for the negotiation 
groups regarding event  . In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that event   is 
independent from other events. Under the assumption that each individual negotiator 




Generally speaking, when a negotiation group discusses event  , members will first  f
                                                 
5 We could have written out the above as a theorem with the proof just given. However, the proposition and 
the somewhat novel demonstration via dynamic programming given here may gain from the emphasis on 
economic meaning in this form of exposition. 
6 We use the word paradigm here in a Kuhnian sense. The avalanche of work in this area does form a 
paradigm within which the “normal science” of modeling decisions with many objectives is carried 
out.Specific models can count as so many artifacts used during the business of carrying out ‘puzzle solving’ 
under the overarching paradigm. 
  13discuss the outcome of attributes under each state of the event; and then obtain the group 
utility of event  . This discussion-behavior of a negotiation group regarding event   can 
be formulated as a multi-objective programming problem. Eq. (12) is objective function of 
a negotiation group regarding event   for all states and attributes. Equation (13) is 
obtained based on the concept described in eq. (11), which is based on the utility value of 





1 + t . In addition, as event   has   states,  let  f n
), ( max{ ) ( 1 x p xj = ψ , ),Λ ( 2 x p ), ( j x p )} ( , n x p Λ ,  ) j x ( ψ  be defined as the maximum probability value 
for every negotiator regarding every state of event  . Eq. (12) represents the utility 
measured by the negotiation group regarding event  . When the   value is in the 
closed interval [0,1], it is easily seen that eqs. (14) and (23) can affect eqs. (12) and (13).
f





) , ( , t x j q k α
 Eqs. (14) and (15) represent the utility value of negotiators   and   at discussion 
#  respectively. The utility function related to the utility of other negotiators at 
discussion #
k
, and the utility of negotiators   and   at discussion #t will affect the 
utility of other negotiators in the next discussion. In addition, Constraints (16) and (17) are 
to ensure that the utility of all the negotiators can satisfy the condition of being in the 
closed interval [0,1]. Equation (18) is to ensure that the sum of the IUV values among 
negotiators satisfies the condition being in the same closed interval.
q 1
8  Equation (19) is 
also to ensure that the utility value of the negotiation group is not negative. Since eqs. (18) 
and (19) meet the constraint of being limited between 0 and 1, so the utility value of the 
negotiation group in eq. (20) meets the constraint of being limited between 0 and 1. 
Equation (21) shows that the IUV value among the negotiators have to be between 0 and 1, 
and   is the decision variable. Equation (23) shows that if consensus cannot be 
reached through discussion among negotiators, the utility value will be calculated as if at 
an independent state; if consensus is reached during discussion, then the utility value after 
the discussion can be substituted. The complete formulation of the maximization problem 
subject to the above constraints then is as follows: 
                                                         (12)    ) 1 ( + t GU Max
                                                 
7 Further generalizations are possible when the metric chosen is not simply the Euclidean metric; but we do 
not pursue this here. 
8 Of course, this ensures ( the proof is immediate and trivial, but the result is nontrivial) that the utility value 
of individual negotiator is not negative. 
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where   is the utility value of negotiation group for event   at discussion 
# 
) 1 ( + t GU f
1
f
+ t ; 
) 1 , ( + t x GU j
f
j x
 is the utility value of a negotiation group for the outcome of 
attribute   toward event  at discussion # f 1 + t ; 
) 1 , ( + t x GU j mau
f
 is the utility value of a group for the outcome of attribute   
toward event  at discussion #
j x
1 + t ; 




 is the utility value of individual negotiator # for the outcome of 
attribute   toward event  at discussion #
q
j f 1 + t ; 




 is the utility value of individual negotiator #  for the outcome of 
attribute   toward event  at discussion #
k
j f 1 + t ; 
) , ( t x u j
f
q  is the utility value of individual negotiator #  for the outcome of  q
  15attribute   toward event  at discussion # j x f t ; 
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f
k  is the utility value of individual negotiator #k  for the outcome of 
attribute   toward event  at discussion # ; 
) 1 , ( j
f
q x u  is the utility value of individual negotiator #q for the outcome of 
attribute   toward event  at discussion #1; 
) 1 , ( j
f
k x u  is the utility value of individual negotiator #k  for the outcome of 










 is the sum value of IUV’s where the utility value of negotiator # 
 affects negotiator #1 at discussion #t , q k Q k ≠ ∈ ∀ ; , the sum value of 









 is the sum value of IUV’s where the utility value of negotiator # 
 affects negotiator #  at discussion  k t , Q k q ∈ , ; and  , the sum 
value of IUV’s is constant and located between 0 and 1; 
q k ≠
, ( , t x j q k α  is the utility value of negotiator #k , which affects the utility of 
negotiator #  for the outcome of attribute   of event   at discussion  q j f t , 
Q k q ∈ ∀ , ; and ; the value of IUV is located between 0 and 1;  q k ≠
, ( , t x j k q α  is the utility value of negotiator #q, which affects the utility of 
negotiator #k  for the outcome of attribute   of event   at discussion # f t , 
Q k q ∈ ∀ , ; and ; the value of IUV is located between 0 and 1;  q k ≠
) ( j x ψ   is maximum probability value for all states of event   by   
negotiators,  ; 
f q
n j ,..., 2 , 1 =
t   is the index of the discussion number,t } , , 2 , 1 , 0 { T Λ ∈ . 
This completes the analytical discussion. What remains to be done is to 
formulate an appropriate algorithm and provide a numerical illustration 
of the applicability of the approach developed here. 
5. The algorithm 
From the dynamic multi-objective programming model, the decision variables are 
,  ,  ,  ) , ( , t x j k q α ) , ( , t x j q k α ) 1 , ( + t xj
f ) 1 , ( + t x GU j  and GU . Therefore the decision 
variables cannot be obtained by solving the simultaneous-equation system. By considering 
the dispersion and feedback characteristics of the model, we develop an iterative 
algorithm, for which the algorithm steps are described as below.    
) 1 ( + t f
Step 0: Set the number of discussions and input the  ) ( j x ψ  value 
   Generally  speaking,  when  solving  the mathematical programming model, the 
  16simulation frequency is related to the optimal solution through the level and rate of 
convergence. However, since the number of discussions can not be infinite in the real 
world, to simplify the analysis we let the number of discussions be finite, and input the 
probability value  ) ( j x ψ . 
Step 1: Set the initial utility value 
   Let   and   represent the utility before discussion for negotiator #  
and #k  respectively; u  and   represent the utility values for discussion #1 
for negotiators   and  , 
) 0 , ( j
f
q x u ) 0 , ( j
f
k x u





) 1 , ( j
f
k x u
Q k , , q , , 2 , Λ Λ = . 
Step 2:Obtain the initial interactive utility value (IUV) 
When discussion is proceeded by the negotiation group, assume that the main 
negotiator (such as the chairman or key negotiator) speaks first; thus we can obtain the 
initial IUV value for the key negotiator. Then, calculate the initial IUV’s value for other 
negotiators. The calculation procedure is as fellows.  
Apply values for   and u  together with   and   to eqs. 
(A-4) and (A-5) in appendix A, to obtain the initial interactive utility value among the 
negotiators, as shown in Eq. (24). Take the absolute value of eq. (24), to make both 
) 0 , ( j
f
q x u ) 0 , ( j
f
k x ) 1 , ( j
f
q x u ) 1 , ( j
f
k x u
) 1 , ( , + t x j k q α  and  ) 1 , ( + t x j ,q k α  satisfy the  non-negativity condition.  
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Step 3: Normalization of the interactive utility value 
This step is to simulate conditions with respect to those negotiators who strongly 
affect others by their own view (strong minded negotiators) as well as those who are 
easily affected by others (obedient negotiators). In either case, it will be difficult model to 
converge. Therefore, we normalize  step 2, which is as shown in eq. (25).  
) 1 , ( ) 1 , (
) 1 , ( ) 1 , (
) 1 , (
min max
min ,
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+ − +
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t x t x
t x
j j
j j k q
j
adj
k q α α
α α
α (25) 
Step 4: Solve the IUV that occurs after discussion 
After normalizing the  , substitute    into the dynamic 
multi-objective programming model and obtain the negotiator’s utility after discussion, 
) 1 , ( , + t x j
adj
q k α ) 1 , ( , + t x j
adj
k q α
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. Since   and   are  the 
pre-discussion IUV values, then obtain   and   to represent values 
after discussion, in accordance with step 2.   
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Step 5: Determine whether the IUV  will converge or not 
    We have to check if  ,   and   as obtained from 
steps 1 to 4, converge or not. The convergence condition can be verified as in appendix B. 
As shown in the appendix B, when  =  or  = 
 satisfy the convergence condition; this indicates that views among the 
negotiators are very close. Therefore,   or  = 
 is one of the(necessary) convergence conditions. When satisfying the 
convergence condition, we skip directly to step 9 below to determine the utility value for 
the negotiation group. If there is no convergence, then proceed to step 6, modify the IUV 
and start the next discussion.  
) 1 , ( + t x j
Step 6: Modify the IUV 
When the model cannot converge, then modify the IUV among the negotiators, as 
below.  
When  , then let  , where  E  is  the 
assumed allowable tolerance-error value.  
Step 7: Modify the individual utility value 
Substitute the modified IUV value (done in step 6)   and   into 
the dynamic multi-objective programming model.  
) 1 , + t j
Step 8: Repeat steps 4 to 7 until the model converges or the end of discussion. 
Step 9: Calculate utility values for individual negotiators and negotiation groups. 
When the obtained solution satisfies the convergence condition, we can obtain 
,  ,  ,  ,   and GU . 
6. A Numerical example 
One particular example is described in this section to demonstrate the usefulness of 
  18the particular approach to analyze the discussion behavior among negotiators developed 
here, using data from Feng, Kang and Tzeng (2000). 
6.1 Description of the loan credit ratio event 
The Concession Company must pay loan interest to the bankers within the 
concession period. If the credit ratio increases, the interest cost will also increase, 
meaning increased risk. Let the credit ratio be 6.5%, 7%, 7.5%, 8%, 8.5%, 9%, and 10%. 
A total of seven states ( ) exists where   represents the level of the loan credit ratio. 
The attribute outcome for this event is interest cost (ic ). Meanwhile,    is the utility 
value for the negotiator regarding attribute outcome, and the occurrence probability for 






rc ( p ) ) ( ) ic u (rc p × = , where u  denotes the utility 
value for a negotiator regarding attribute and state. Meanwhile, ( ),   and   all 
correspond to each state (rc), so each has eight values. The outcomes of attribute, utility 
value of each negotiator and the probability of a specific state negotiator for each event 
are given.   
) (I
ic ) (ic u ) (rc p
Assume that there are six negotiators in the negotiation group of the BOT Concession 
Company, and they discuss the bank loan credit ratio. Before discussion, each individual 
negotiator measures the utility of each state of the event, and the measurement results are 
shown in Table 2, where utility is calculated by eqs. (1) and (2).  
      Table 2 Utility value by negotiator regarding the bank loan credit ratio 
Negotiator     states      
  6.5% 7.0% 7.5%  8%  8.5%  9%  10% 
Negotiator #1  0.1990 0.4701 0.8737  0.4020  0.0613  0.0121  0.0089 
Negotiator #2  0.9589 0.8693 0.4330  0.2432  0.0992  0.0449  0.0020 
Negotiator #3  0.4680 0.3306 0.2906  0.0546  0.0660  0.0171  0.0090 
Negotiator #4  0.1157 0.5478 0.6089  0.4990  0.0024  0.0002  0.0090 
Negotiator #5  0.8404 0.6843 0.4235  0.2908  0.0261  0.0018  0.0011 
Negotiator #6  0.2016 0.7225 0.7280  0.3570  0.0990  0.0121  0.0001 
Source: Feng, et al. (2000)  
 
We used Turbo Pascal 7.0 to write the simulation program and to calculate the 
post-discussion values to obtain IUV, individual negotiators’ utility, the number of 
discussion after convergence and the utility value of the negotiation group. The detailed 
steps are as follows:   
Step 0: Set the number of discussions and the input  ) ( j x ψ  value 
Let the number of discussion be finite and set it to be 50, which is  ; and  50 ≤ T
  19input the probability values  ) ( j x ψ , which are 0.9589, 0.9150, 0.9540, 0.6112, 
0.45, 0.2211 and 0.101, respectively; those values are obtained from Feng, Kang 
and Tzeng (2000). 
Step 1:Under the state 9% in Table 2, the utility value of each negotiator is 0.0121, 0.0449, 
0.0171, 0.0002, 0.0018 and 0.0121, respectively. Add   value,  , to 
the utility of each negotiator and obtain negotiators’ utilities as 0.01211, 0.04491, 
0.01711, 0.00021, 0.00181 and 0.01211, respectively, which is the initial utility 
value during discussion.  
e 00001 . 0 = e
Step 2: Substitute the initial utility value of Step 1 into equation (24), and obtain the initial 
IUV,  ) 1 %, 9 ( ,k q α , as in Table 3. For example,  00030 . 0 ) 1 %, 9 ( 1 , 2 = α  represents that 
at discussion #1, the utility value of negotiator #2 affecting negotiator #1 is 
0.0003, and the rest of the IUV’s can be deduced by analogy. As shown in Table 
3, the interactive utility value among some negotiators is symmetric, while 
others are not equal.  
  















Negotiator  #1 NA  0.00030 0.00200 0.00084 0.00097 0.00000 
Negotiator  #2 0.00030  NA  0.00032 0.09998 0.00566 0.00087 
Negotiator  #3 0.00200 0.10000  NA  0.00032 0.00059 0.00180 
Negotiator  #4 0.00084 0.00022 0.00059  NA  0.00000 0.00000 
Negotiator  #5 0.00097 0.10000 0.10000 0.00625  NA  0.00087 
Negotiator  #6 1.00000 0.10000 0.10000 0.00084 0.10000  NA 
 
Step 3: As shown in Table 3, the IUV difference among part of the negotiators is small  or 
they are equal; but the differences between the negotiators is great. This reflects 
that the point of view among the negotiators is great, therefore we apply Eq. (25) 
to normalize the IUV’s in Table 3.   
Step 4: Substitute the normalized IUV and the initial utility of Step 3 into the basic model 
to obtain the negotiator’s utility values after discussion #1, which are 
=0.0376,  =0.0196,  =0.05068,  =0.11378,   
=0.22152 and  =0.01045, respectively. These are the utility values after 
discussion #1, and are different from the minor adjusted utility of Step 1. 
Compared with Step 1, there are obvious changes for the negotiator’s utility after 
) 1 %, 9 ( *
1 u ) 1 %, 9 ( *
2 u
) 1 %, 9
) 1 %, 9 ( *
3 u ) 1 %, 9 ( *




  20discussion #1. Then substitute the utility value of each of the six negotiator into 
eq. (24), and obtain the IUV,  , after discussion #1, as shown in Table 4.  ) 1 %, 9 (
*
,k q α
) 1 %, 9 ( *
6 u
) 1 %, 9 ( *
, q q k α
) 5 %, 9 ( *
,k q α
















Negotiator #1  NA  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00425  0.00425
Negotiator #2  0.29185 NA 0.34434  0.21415  0.2221  0.29185  1.36429
Negotiator #3  0.26944 0.04846  NA  0.07972 0.08805 0.26944  0.75511
Negotiator #4  1.00000 0.32844 0.86871  NA  1.00000 1.00000  4.19715
Negotiator #5  1.00000 0.29859 0.84112  1  NA  1.00000  4.13971
Negotiator #6  0.00000 0.07850 0.51493 0.21636 0.24997  NA  1.05976
total  2.56129 0.75399 2.56910 1.51023 1.56012 2.56554  NA 
 
Step 5: Apply u  and    of Step 4, to obtain 
 and  . The summation of columns is 0.00425, 
1.34629, 0.75511, 4.19715, 4.13971 and the summation of rows are 1.05976; 
2.56129, 0.75399, 2.56910, 1.56012 and 2.56554, respectively. This indicates 
that a specific negotiator’s utility that is affected by other negotiators is not 
equal to the utility of other negotiators that are affected by the specific 
negotiator; and it does not satisfy the convergence condition of the model, 
requiring further revision as shown in Step 6.  




) 1 %, 9 ( k , ∑ ≠ k k
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Step 6: Let the tolerance error, E , be 0.0001; as  >0.0001, let 
0.0001. This is the input value for the revised IUV of 
discussion #2. The revision of other IUV’s are similar.  
) 1 %, 9 ( *
1 , 2 α ) 1 %, 9 ( *
2 , 1 α −
= ) 2 %, 9 ( 1 , 2 α − ) 1 %, 9 ( *
2 , 1 α
Step 7: Substitute all the   into  the  basic  model  and perform the second 
simulation. 
) 2 %, 9 ( ,k q α
Step 8: Repeat the calculation from Step 4 to Step 7 
Through the repeated simulation of Step 8, the model reaches the convergence 
condition after discussion #5, where   is as shown in Table 5. The IUV shows the 
symmetry in this case, and the utility impact of negotiator #4 affecting other negotiators is 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0 and 0.00425, which is the same as the utility impact of the other negotiators 
affecting  negotiator #4.  The sum of IUV’s for each negotiator is 0.00001, 0.00001, 
0.00425, 0.00425, 0.00000 and 0.00850. This satisfies the condition for model and the 
discussion can be ended for this state. In another words, these six negotiators reach 
  21"consensus" at discussion #5. Then, we can obtain  =0.03760,  =0.04490, 
=0.00002,  = 0.00002,  =0.00002 and  =0.00001, for the 
negotiation group regarding bank credit ratio at 9%. In addition, GU =0.05068, 
where    is the risk measurement for post-discussion utility, of those six 
negotiators toward bank credit ratio at 9% of event  . 
) 5 %, 9 ( *
1 u
f
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Table 5 Results of IUV among negotiators under the convergent condition   
















Negotiator #1  NA  0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000  0.00001
Negotiator #2  0.00001  NA  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000  0.00001
Negotiator #3  0.00000  0.00000 NA 0.00000  0.00000  0.00425  0.00425
Negotiator #4  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 NA 0.00000  0.00425  0.00425
Negotiator #5  0.00000  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000  NA  0.00000  0.00000
Negotiator #6  0.00000  0.00000 0.00425 0.00425 0.00000  NA  0.00850
Total  0.00001  0.00001 0.00425 0.00425 0.00000 0.00850  0.01702
 
From the above analysis, the model and solution algorithm developed in this paper 
can describe the discussion behavior among the negotiators, so we can continue to apply 
this model to the utility measurement and risk measurement of  events other loan credit 
ratios. Following the assumptions made in Feng and Kang (2000), we assume that the 
state of the event is independent. Simulate the discussion among the negotiators by 
applying data in Table 2, and obtain the discussion number, utility change and 
convergence of each state of the event; results are summarized in Table 6.  
Simulating all the states of the event for 50 times, the number of discussions for each 
state are 28, 50, 50, 50, 4, 5 and 6. The utility value of the negotiation group for each state 
is 0.59044, 3.21145, 2.95137, 1.59945, 0.05949, 0.05068 and 0.53806, respectively. As for 
credit ratio at 7.0%, 7.5 and 8.0%, it can not reach convergence even after 50 times 
simulation, so no convergent solution is obtained for the IUV. The utility value for other 
states are all less than one, meeting the convergence condition.  
For utility changing of individual negotiators regarding credit ratio at 6.5%, the 
post-discussion utility value of negotiators #2, #3, #5 and # 6 is greatly decreased 
compared with the value before discussion. The variation for credit ratio at 10.0% is also 
great, except for negotiator #1, the utility value after discussion of all other negotiators is 
obviously increased. This shows that all six negotiators change their original assessed 
  22utility after discussion, as shown in Table 6. In addition, for utility changing of the 
negotiation group, the pre-discussion   is obtained by using the additive MAU 
model from Feng and Kang, (2000). As for the post-discussion,   is obtained by 
applying the dynamic multi-objective programming model. Compared with the pre- and 
post-discussion utility value, GU  and  , except for credit ratio at 8.5%, 
there are obvious changes for all other states. Compared with the pre-discussion 
, there is a substantial increase for the post-discussion  . This shows 
that during discussion, some negotiator was significantly affected by other negotiators and 
changed the original risk measurement for the utility, while the others show no significant 
change.   
) ( j mau x GU
) ,t x j GU
) , ( t x GU j
, (x GU j
( mau ) , ( t x j
) , ( t x GU j mau ) t
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Table 6 Pre- and post-discussion measured utility value regarding the bank loan credit ratio event 
State     The  Loan  Credit  Ratio   
Utility Discussion 6.5% 7.0% 7.5% 8.0% 8.5% 9.0%  10.0% 
Nego.#1 Pre  0.19900 0.47010 0.87370 0.40200 0.06130 0.01210 0.00890
 Post  0.17350 0.44460 0.84820 0.37650 0.03580 0.03760 0.03440
 Variation  -0.02550 -0.02550 -0.02550 -0.02550 -0.02550 0.02550 0.02550
Nego.# 2  Pre  0.95890 0.86930 0.43300 0.24320 0.09920 0.04490 0.00200
 Post  0.11534 0.79091 0.43905 0.25192 0.02369 0.01301 0.05261
 Variation  -0.84356 -0.07839 0.00605 0.00872 -0.07551 -0.03189  0.05061
Nego. #3  Pre  0.46800 0.33060 0.29060 0.05460 0.06600 0.01710 0.00900
 Post  0.06166 0.44195 0.41883 0.19242 0.00000 0.00002 0.17901
 Variation  -0.40634 0.11135 0.12823 0.13782 -0.06600 -0.01708  0.17001
Nego. #4  Pre  0.11570 0.54780 0.60890 0.49900 0.00240 0.00020 0.00900
 Post  0.11981 0.50176 0.41507 0.26065 0.00000 0.00002 0.17901
 Variation  0.00411 -0.04604 -0.19383 -0.23835 -0.00240 -0.00018  0.17001
Nego. #5  Pre  0.84040 0.68430 0.42350 0.29080 0.02610 0.00180 0.00110
 Post  0.07877 0.51609 0.41062 0.26004 0.00000 0.00002 0.46513
 Variation  -0.76164 -0.16821 -0.01288 -0.03076 -0.02610 -0.00178  0.46403
Nego. #6  Pre  0.20160 0.72250 0.72800 0.35700 0.09900 0.01210 0.00010
 Post  0.04136 0.51614 0.41960 0.25792 0.00000 0.00001 0.46513
 Variation  -0.16024 -0.20636 -0.30840 -0.09908 -0.09900 -0.01209  0.46503
Converge /diverge  9  ×  ×  ×  9  9  9 
Discussion No.  28 50 50 50  4  5  5 
Pre-Dis.  ) ( j mau x GU   0.42820 0.56250 0.53640 0.28870 0.05700 0.01360 0.00560
Post-Dis.  ) ( j x GU   0.59044 3.21145 2.95137 1.59945 0.05949 0.05068 0.53806
  ) ( j x ψ   0.9589 0.915 0.954 0.6112 0.45 0.2211  0.101
Note :"×" is diverge￿"9" is converge  
 
For risk measurement of the event, after 50 cycles of simulation, the   value 
will be substituted  by GU  at credit ratio of 7.0%, 7.5% and8.0%. Calculated 
according to eq. (22), the utility value of the event 
) , ( t x GU j
) , ( t x j mau
) 1 ( + t GU  is 0.56617, which is greater 
the average utility value, 0.25689. Therefore, the event of bank loan credit ratio, after 
discussion among the negotiators, is a non-risk event.  
Compared with the study done by Feng and Kang (2000), if the negotiator's utility is 
independent, the utility measured by the negotiation group toward the loan credit ratio 
event is 0.4001, and expected utility value is 0.2877 for pre-discussion, which is greater 
than 0.2877. This implies that the pre-discussion utility measured by the negotiation group 
  24toward the bank loan credit ratio appears to be a non-risk event. Compared with the pre- 
and post-discussion, the utility measured by the negotiation group toward the bank loan 
credit ratio appears to be a non-risk event. The results are shown in Table 7. 
 
    Table 7 Compared utility measurement by pre/ post discussion  
The event of Bank 
loan credit ratio 





Pre-discussion 0.4001  0.2877 Non-risk 
Post-discussion 0.56617  0.25689 Non-risk 
 
From the numerical example, we can summarize the following key points: (1) if the 
utility difference among the negotiators becomes smaller, the model converges more 
easily; otherwise, it is difficult for the model to converge and the number of discussions 
will increase. This makes intuitive sense. (2) With increasing number of discussions, the 
IUV’s among the negotiators will decrease. This is not obvious, but results from the 
deeper structure of the model itself. Clearly, both the results are nontrivial. 
7. Summary and Conclusions: 
    Dynamic programming and multi-objective programming are adopted in this paper to  
formulate and test a risk measurement model for interactive negotiators.The numerical 
example shown in this paper demonstrates the feasibility of this particular model.  As 
shown in the model, algorithm and numerical example presented earlier, the sum of the 
IUVs  will determine whether the utility among negotiators is independent or not. When 
the sum of the IUVs approaches zero, the level of dependence among the negotiators is 
lower, which naturally, means greater independence. When the sum of the IUV’s 
approaches one, the level of dependence among the negotiators becomes very strong. In 
addition, as the utility difference among the negotiators decreases monotonically,  the 
model has a convergent solution. And as the utility difference among the negotiators 
increases, the number of discussions will also increase leading possibly to divergence.  
As demonstrated by the results from the numerical example, risk measured by the 
negotiation group of a BOT Concession Company with respect to the event of bank loan 
credit ratio shows that it is a non-risk event both before and after discussion.This is quite a 
significant finding, and depends crucially on the formal approach adopted. It can be seen 
also that the dynamic multi-objective programming model developed in this paper can be 
used as the basis for negotiation discussion, to explain the interactive utility among the 
  25negotiators and risk measurement of the negotiation group with respect to some specific 
event.  
We have relaxed the independent utility condition for negotiators, and demonstrated 
the interactive behavior among negotiators and risk measurement for a specific event. The 
model developed in this paper treats IUVs as endogenous variables of the negotiator’s 
utility function. Besides the utility interaction among the negotiators, factors that may 
affect the utility function include learning capability of the negotiator as well as   
incomplete information. These factors can be incorporated into the model for further study. 
In the future, the assumption of event independence made in this paper can be relaxed and 
the model can be revised by developing a risk measurement utility model for multiple 
events discussed among a negotiation group. Future research can also attempt to improve 
upon the model algorithm in this paper in order to make the algorithm cmputationally 
more efficient. However, for many practical purposes( e.g., a BOT project ), the model as 
developed here can be readily applied with reasonable success. 
 
 
Appendix A: Solving the equations to Derive (Dependent) Utility Values 
of Negotiators 
Assume that the linear dependent utility for negotiators   and q  are as Eq. (A-1) 
and (A-2), and solve for 
k
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. , 2 , 1 , 0 , , T t Q q k Λ = ∈ ∀ t is discussion number. Substitute Eq. (A-1) into Eq. (A-2) to get Eq. 
(A-3). 
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=             (A-3)  
Substitute Eq. (A-3) into the variable   of Eq. (A-2), yielding  ) , ( t x u j
f
k ) , ( , t x j k q α  
value, shown as Eq. (A-4); therefore, substitute the  ) , ( , t x j k q α   value into Eq. (A-3) and 
get the  ) , ( , t x j q k α  value, the result shows as Eq. (A-5). 
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Appendix B: Derivation of Convergence Condition 
  To show the convergence condition of iterative algorithm for dynamic multi-objective 
programming. We modify Eq. (A-1) to (B-1) by applying Eq. (A-1) and (A-2). The 
left-hand side of Eq. (B-1) represents the incremental utility difference between 
negotiators   and  . The right-hand-side utility of Eq. (B-1) represents the utility of 
negotiator   as affected by negotiator  . This can reach equal in IUV’s and therefore Eq. 
(B-1) can be represented by Eq. (B-2). 
k q
k q
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(B-1) 






k α = = ∆ + ∆λ                                
(B-2) 
The same as above, modify Eq. (A-2) into (B-3), which represents the difference of 
incremental utility value of negotiator   and k, which can also be shown as the utility 
incremental method, such as Eq. (B-4). 
q








q − = − + α                       
(B-3) 






q α = = ∆ + ∆λ                                
(B-4) 
Equation (B-4) indicates the incremental ratio of the negotiator’s utility. If the change of 
utility becomes stable, then the utility incremental ratios of Eqs. (B-2) and (B-4) tend to 
be equal, which is  . This implies that the 
IUV of negotiator k  and   tend to be equal, which is 








q ∆ + ∆ = ∆ + ∆
q ( ,k q ) , ( ) , , t x t x j q k j α α = , and 
development procedure is as below. 
    As the incremental utility becomes stable, indicating that the smaller the difference 
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      (B-5) 
To keep  1 ) , ( ) , ( 0 , , ≤ − ≤ t x t x j q k j k q α α , modify Eq. (B-5) to Eq. (B-6). 
| ) , ( ) , ( | min min , , , t x t x j q k j k q k q α α γ − =                                      (B-6) 
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q k
f
k q j q k j k q k q nu nu t x t x λ λ− = − = α α γ                    (B-7) 
Equation (B-7) indicates that minimum difference in IUV, so we differentiate  ) , ( , t x j k q α  
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q α α = ⇒ ∆ + ∆ = ∆ + ∆
As shown in Eq. (B-8), when the utilities of negotiator   and   become stable, their 
IUVs tend to be equal. In another words, when  , there is a convergent 




) t , ( ) , ( , x t x j q j k q α =
) , ( , t x j k q α = 0 ) , ( , = t x j q k α ,  1 ) , ( ) , ( , , = = t x t x j q k j k q α α  or 
, this satisfies the convergence condition of the model. The 
meaning of the convergent solution is that there is no utility change among the negotiators 
due to discussion, and the negotiators have reached "consensus".   
∑ ∑ = k j q k j k k q t x t x ) , ( ) , ( , , α α
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